الحاجة إلى عيون وآذان في طهران

بقلم: تشارلز دونبار- السفير الأمريكي السابق في قطر واليمن.

هيرالد تربيون - 14/5/2007

A need for eyes and ears in Tehran

By Charles Dunbar The Boston Globe

Published: May 14, 2007

BOSTON :

Before the regional conference on Iraq that was held in Egypt earlier this month, there was intense speculation about a possible meeting between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki. It did not happen.

A lesson to be drawn from this missed opportunity is that the United States needs a diplomatic presence in Tehran . Particularly when relations between two governments are bad, high-level discussions between them need the careful preparation that a regular diplomatic dialogue could provide. When an American diplomat is assigned to a country that has damaged U.S. interests, he or she is uniquely placed to say and be told things, and propose and consider solutions, in private. The British ambassador in Tehran , for instance, may have used his access to the Iranian government to help secure the release of the British sailors and marines captured by the Iranian revolutionary guard in March.

In our case, our representatives could have explained privately the concerns we have with the Iranian government's activities in Iraq and elsewhere and heard its complaints about ours. There is no substitute for the give-and-take of such discussions as a means of narrowing differences and making eventual high-level contacts more fruitful.

Beyond access, diplomats on the ground make their government smarter about the country where they work. The United States is at a big disadvantage in Iran , as we have not had diplomats working in Tehran for 27 years. That is three years and 10 years longer, respectively, than our diplomatic absences from Communist China and the Soviet Union , two countries whose governments we did not fancy. Our diplomats in Beijing and Moscow made us smarter about China and the Soviet Union over the years. We need such on-the-ground knowledge of Iran .

This could come about gradually. Indeed, the diplomatic relations broken in 1979 should not be restored for now. Instead, a few linguistically qualified diplomats could work within the embassy of Switzerland , which represents U.S. interests in Iran . The government of Pakistan does the same job for Iran in the United States , and there are Iranians working in the Pakistani embassy in Washington . The United States believes formal diplomatic relations should await progress in settling U.S.-Iranian differences. This makes sense, but it need not prevent the opening of a United States "interests section" in Tehran . Interest sections, like those of the United States in Havana and Cuba in Washington , are familiar sights on the diplomatic landscape.

What American diplomats assigned to Tehran could accomplish should not be exaggerated. They would not be able to ferret out Iranian military and nuclear secrets, and the inner workings of the regime would be a closed book. Relations between the two governments would remain tense, and it would be hard for American officials to make the sorts of contacts with their Iranian counterparts that are a diplomat's stock in trade.

Furthermore, American diplomats in Tehran would be at risk. They would be closely watched and could face provocations. Although the Iranian regime is more disciplined now than it was in 1979, they could even be taken hostage. Close contact with those in the regime seeking a better U.S.-Iranian relationship, support from friendly embassies in Tehran , and resourceful diplomats whose hearts are not faint would all be needed.

Is such a game worth the candle? As a foreign service officer 25 years ago, I took on such an assignment in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan . A senior State Department official told me to go to Kabul "and tell us what life there is like." This was hard to do. As a matter of policy, I was enjoined from having regular contact with Afghan officials, my movements were closely monitored by the secret police, and anyone I saw was at risk of severe reprisals by the regime. I myself was even captured briefly by the Afghan resistance. Still, I managed to develop relations with people who had verifiable information on the Afghan-Soviet war and other matters. I came to have a sense of whether the regime and its Soviet masters were succeeding or failing in getting the populace to accept the government's writ.

Likewise, having a worm's eye view of whether President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Ahmadinejad is succeeding or failing would be of high value to Washington .

Security considerations make sending diplomats to Tehran a tough call, but one the U.S. government must make.

Charles Dunbar, former U.S. ambassador to Qatar and Yemen, teaches international relations at Boston University . This article first appeared in The Boston Globe.

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/14/opinion/eddunbar.php

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نشرنا لهذه المقالات لا يعني أنها تعبر عن وجهة نظر المركز كلياً أو جزئياً

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من حق الزائر الكريم أن ينقل وأن ينشر كل ما يعجبه من موقعنا . معزواً إلينا ، أو غير معزو .ـ